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Abstract—Pattern recognition in neuroimaging distinguishes
between two types of models: encoding- and decoding models.
This distinction is based on the insight that brain state features,
that are found to be relevant in an experimental paradigm,
carry a different meaning in encoding- than in decoding models.
In this paper, we argue that this distinction is not sufficient:
Relevant features in encoding- and decoding models carry a
different meaning depending on whether they represent causal-
or anti-causal relations. We provide a theoretical justification for
this argument and conclude that causal inference is essential for
interpretation in neuroimaging.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pattern recognition in neuroimaging aims to provide insights
into the neural basis of cognitive processes. Two types of
models are used in this endeavor: encoding- and decoding
models. Encoding models predict a subject’s brain state for
a given experimental condition, while decoding models aim to
reconstruct experimental conditions from neuroimaging data.
This difference has important consequences for the interpre-
tation of brain state features that are found to be relevant in
each type of model.
It has been argued that only encoding models can provide
a complete functional description of a region of interest [1].
Decoding models, on the other hand, may determine brain state
features as relevant that are statistically independent of the
experimental condition [2]. While in linear decoding models
potential misinterpretations can be avoided by converting them
into encoding models [3], this is a substantially more difficult
problem for non-linear decoding models. As decoding models
are becoming ever more popular in the analysis of neuroimag-
ing data [4], the correct interpretation of such models is of
considerable importance.
In this paper, we argue that the distinction between
encoding- and decoding models is not sufficient to determine
the meaning of relevant features in each type of model: Pattern
recognition models need to be further distinguished with re-
spect to whether they learn causal- or anti-causal relations [5].
In general, neuroimaging studies are based on the following
causal structure: stimulus → brain activity → response. We
note that more complex experimental paradigms, in which
responses again act as stimuli [6], can also be modeled in this
way by considering time-resolved variables, e. g. stimulus[t0]
→ brain activity[t1] → response[t2]. Depending on whether
experimental conditions are chosen to represent stimuli or
responses, encoding- and decoding models then model causal-
or anti-causal relations. In the following, we argue that this
has important consequences for the interpretation of relevant
features in each type of model. Furthermore, we argue that
interpretation of neuroimaging data de facto requires causal
inference problems to be solved.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
section II we introduce the necessary notation and terminology
to formulate our proposed distinction of pattern recognition
models in section II-D. Next, we theoretically investigate the
interpretability of relevant features in each type of pattern
recognition model (sections III-A to III-D) and briefly summa-
rize our findings in section III-E. In section IV we argue that
interpreting encoding- and decoding models is only a first step
towards solving causal inference problems in the interpretation
of neuroimaging data. We close with a conclusion in section V.
II. PATTERN RECOGNITION MODELS
A. Notation
By X we denote the brain states represented by d features
obtained from neuroimaging data, i. e. X = {X1, ..., Xd}; by
Y we denote the (usually discrete) experimental conditions.
Throughout this paper we use the notations p(X), p(X|Y ) and
p(X,Y ) for (conditional or joint) probability density functions
(PDFs). All PDFs are assumed to be known.
Independence is denoted by X ⊥ Y and conditional
independence by X ⊥ Y |Z. Dependence and conditional
dependence is denoted by X 6⊥ Y and X 6⊥ Y |Z, respectively.
Causal relations in a directed acyclic graph are denoted by
X → Y [7].
B. Encoding and decoding models
An encoding model p(X|Y ) represents how various ex-
perimental conditions are encoded in different brain states.
We ask “How does the brain state look like given a certain
experimental condition?”. Examples for encoding models are
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the general linear model [8] or the class-conditional mean:
E{X|Y }.
A decoding model p(Y |X) represents how different exper-
imental conditions can be inferred from different brain states
[9]. We ask “Which experimental condition is most likely
given a certain brain state?”. Decoding models are for example
obtained using support vector machines or linear regression.
Note that this distinction solely reflects the direction of
modeling according to the brain state but neglects any causal
relation between brain state and experimental condition that
might be known a priori.
C. Causal and anti-causal learning
The brain is constantly exposed to the world’s stimuli and
processes them, e. g. giving raise to perceptions. As such,
stimuli S can only be causes but not effects of brain states X .
The brain also constantly generates responses, e. g. movements,
that are caused by the brain states. This gives rise to the
following causal structure in neuroimaging studies: stimulus
→ brain state → response. Note that we are not necessarily
able to observe all stimuli that cause a certain brain state or all
features of the brain state which are causal for R. The causal
structure enables us to distinguish between the following two
scenarios:
1) Stimulus-based experiments: In a stimulus-based exper-
iment the experimental conditions Y correspond to stimuli
S presented to the subject. In general, we can control the
stimulus presentation procedure and are thus able to randomize
the presentation of stimuli. An example of a stimulus-based
experiment is the randomized presentation of auditory stimuli
to either the left or right ear. The causal structure of this setup
is given by S → X , i. e. stimuli cause brain activity.
In this case the encoding model p(X|Y ) = p(X|S) repre-
sents a causal relation, while the decoding model p(Y |X) =
p(S|X) models an anti-causal relation.
2) Response-based experiments: In a response-based ex-
periment the experimental conditions Y represent subjects’
responses that we observe. An example of a response-based
experiment is the recording of volitional movements of either
the left or right hand. The causal structure of this setup is given
by X → R, i. e. brain activity causes responses. Note that in
this setting we are not able to control for and randomize the
experimental conditions.
In contrast to a stimulus-based experiment, the encoding
model p(X|Y ) = p(X|R) of a response-based experiment
represents an anti-causal relation, while the decoding model
p(Y |X) = p(R|X) models a causal relation.
D. Distinction of pattern recognition models
Considering both the distinction of encoding- and decoding
models and the distinction of stimulus- and response-based
experiments we obtain the following four types of models:
A. Causal encoding models – p(X|S)
B. Anti-causal decoding models – p(S|X)
C. Anti-causal encoding models – p(X|R)
D. Causal decoding models – p(R|X)
In the following section we provide theoretical justifications
why this distinction needs to be considered before interpreting
encoding- or decoding models. As we show, interpretability
of relevant features depends on whether the model represents
causal or anti-causal relations.
III. INTERPRETATION OF RELEVANT FEATURES
When interpreting an encoding model p(X|Y ), we want
to link features relevant for encoding to the experimental
condition. Relevant here means that we determine the set of
brain state features that the encoding model deems dependent
on the experimental condition, i. e. the features Xi for which
p(Xi|Y ) 6= p(Xi) and hence Xi 6⊥ Y . The remaining features
are independent of Y . One way to do this in practice is to
test the class-conditional sample means of each feature for
statistically significant differences. Features that, according to
this univariate test, significantly vary with Y are considered
relevant for the encoding model.
When interpreting a decoding model p(Y |X), we want
to determine which features are relevant for decoding the
experimental condition. Relevant here means that we determine
if a brain state feature or a set of features Xi helps in
decoding the experimental condition, i. e. it is tested whether
p(Y |X) 6= p(Y |X \ Xi) and hence Xi 6⊥ Y |X \ Xi. One
way to do this in practice is recursive feature elimination, i. e.
permuting or removing Xi from the feature set and testing
whether this significantly decreases decoding accuracy [10].
It is common to remove all features that are irrelevant for
decoding to reduce dimensionality and obtain the minimal set
of features that yields an optimal decoding model. Features of
that set are considered relevant for the decoding model. We
note that there might be other ways of identifying relevant
features of a decoding model which might lead to different
conclusions.
For our theoretical arguments we assume that we can
identify all relevant features for each type of model. We now
show that relevant features in encoding- and decoding models
carry a different meaning depending on the causal structure.
A. Causal encoding models
From the encoding model p(X|Y ) = p(X|S) of a stimulus-
based experiment we obtain the set XencS of features that are
dependent on S, i. e. for every Xi ∈ XencS we have S 6⊥ Xi.
We denote the complementary set as Xenc0 := X \XencS .
According to Reichenbach’s principle [11], the dependency
between S and XencS implies that S → XencS , S ← XencS , or
S ← H → XencS with H a joint common cause of S and XencS .
In the stimulus-based setting we can control for and randomize
the stimulus. This enables us to rule out the last two cases and
conclude S → XencS , i. e. the features in XencS are genuine
effects of S [12].
In addition, we have S ⊥ Xenc0 , which allows us to conclude
that features in Xenc0 are not genuine effects of S.
As such, all relevant features in a causal encoding model are
genuine effects of S, while irrelevant features are not effects
of S.
B. Anti-causal decoding models
From the decoding model p(Y |X) = p(S|X) of a stimulus-
based experiment we obtain the minimal set XdecS of features
that allows to decode the stimulus, i. e. p(S|X) = p(S|XdecS ).
It hence holds that S ⊥ Xdec0 |XdecS where Xdec0 := X \ XdecS
is the set of features that do not further improve decoding.
We now describe two counterexamples that show that one
can neither conclude that features in Xdec0 are not genuine
effects of S nor that features in XdecS are indeed genuine effects
of S. First, assume S → X1 → X2. Since p(S|X1, X2) =
p(S|X1), i. e. S ⊥ X2|X1, we have X2 ∈ Xdec0 although X2
is actually a genuine effect of S. Second, assume S → X1 ←
X2. Since p(S|X2, X1) 6= p(S|X1), i. e. S 6⊥ X2|X1, we
obtain X2 ∈ XdecS although X2 is not a genuine effect of S.
This establishes that interpreting anti-causal decoding mod-
els in this way has two drawbacks. First, features in XdecS can
only be considered as potential effects of S. Second, genuine
effects of S might be missed.
C. Anti-causal encoding models
Form the encoding model p(X|Y ) = p(X|R) of a response-
based experiment we obtain the set of features that are de-
pendent on R, i. e. for every Xi ∈ XencR we have Xi 6⊥ R.
We denote the complementary set as Xenc0 := X \ XencR
(overloading notation).
According to Reichenbach’s principle, the dependency be-
tween Xi ∈ XencR and R implies that Xi → R, Xi ← R, or
Xi ← H → R with H a joint common cause of Xi and R. A
priori we know that brain activity → response. This enables
us to rule out the case Xi ← R. As we show next, we can not
uniquely determine which of the last two scenarios is the case,
i. e. features in XencR are potential but not necessarily genuine
causes of R.
Consider X2 ← X1 → R: we have X1 6⊥ R and X2 6⊥ R
and therefore X1, X2 ∈ XencR . But note that X1 → R while
X2 6→ R, i. e. X2 is not a cause of R. This shows that features
in XencR are not necessarily genuine causes of R.
Features in Xenc0 , on the other hand, are independent of R
and can hence be considered to be no causes of R.
As such, not all relevant features in anti-causal encoding
models are genuine causes of R, while irrelevant features are
indeed not causal for R.
D. Causal decoding models
From the decoding model p(Y |X) = p(R|X) of a response-
based experiment we obtain the minimal set XdecR of features
that allows to decode the response, i. e. p(R|X) = p(R|XdecR ).
It hence holds that S ⊥ Xdec0 |XdecR where Xdec0 := X \ XdecR
is the set of features that do not further improve decoding.
We now describe two counterexamples that show that one
can neither conclude that features in Xdec0 are not genuine
causes of R nor that features in XdecR are genuine causes of
R. First, assume X2 → X1 → R. Since p(R|X1, X2) =
p(R|X1), i. e. X2 ⊥ R|X1, we have X2 ∈ Xdec0 although
X2 is a cause of R. Second, assume the graph shown in
figure 1 where H is a hidden common cause of X1, X2 and
X1 H X2
R
Fig. 1. Causal graph of an exemplary response-based experiment: H is not
observable as a brain state feature and hence denotes a hidden common cause
of the observed brain state features X1 and X2 and the response R.
R which is not observable as a brain state feature. Since
p(R|X2, X1) 6= p(R|X1) and p(R|X2, X1) 6= p(R|X2) we
have X1, X2 ∈ XdecR although both X1 and X2 are not causes
of R.
This establishes that interpreting causal decoding models
this way has two drawbacks. First, features in XdecR are not
necessarily causes of R. Second, genuine of R causes might
be missed.
E. Subsumption
In the previous sections we showed that the interpretation of
relevant features in encoding- and decoding models depends
on the underlying causal structure. This justifies our argument
that the distinction of encoding- and decoding models is not
sufficient. In particular we argued that, without employing
further assumptions,
A. causal encoding models p(X|S) allow to identify genuine
effects XS of S.
B. anti-causal decoding models p(S|X) allow to identify some
potential effects of S.
C. anti-causal encoding models p(X|R) allow to identify
potential causes of R.
D. causal decoding models p(R|X) allow to identify some
potential causes of R.
IV. CAUSAL INFERENCE IN NEUROIMAGING
So far, we have argued that the causal structure of a
neuroimaging study, i. e. whether we learn in causal- or anti-
causal direction, has to be taken into account when interpreting
relevant features in encoding- and decoding models. In par-
ticular, we have shown that, with the exception of the causal
encoding model, the meaning of relevant features in encoding-
and decoding models is ambiguous. In the following, we
demonstrate on two examples that such ambiguities can be
resolved by means of causal inference [7, 13]. Throughout
this section we assume faithfulness, i. e. we assume that
all observed (conditional) independence relations are implied
by the causal structure [13]. In the following examples, we
additionally assume causal sufficiency, i. e. we assume that
there are no hidden confounders.
A. Causal inference in stimulus-based experiments
Consider two brain state features X1 and X2 in a stimulus-
based experiment with S 6⊥ X1, S ⊥ X2, and S 6⊥ X2|X1.
If we learn an encoding model on this data, we find that
X1 ∈ XencS and X2 ∈ Xenc0 . We can thus conclude that X1 is
an effect of S, i. e. S → X1 (cf. section III-A). We can not,
however, determine the causal relation between X1 and X2.
If we learn a decoding model, on the other hand, we find
that X1, X2 ∈ XdecS , i. e. we find both features to be relevant
for decoding S, as S 6⊥ X2|X1 and S → X1.
Under the assumptions of faithfulness and causal sufficiency,
the only causal structure that can give rise to these observations
is S → X1 ← X2, i. e. X2 is a cause of X1 [7].
By learning both an encoding- and a decoding model on
the same data, and comparing relevant features, we have
thus determined the causal relations between the observed
variables. An example of this inference procedure, known as
the inference rule for potential causation [7], is given in [14].
B. Causal inference in response-based experiments
Consider two brain state features X1 and X2 in a response-
based experiment with X1 6⊥ R, X2 6⊥ R and X2 ⊥ R|X1.
If we learn an encoding model on this data, we find that
X1, X2 ∈ XencR as X1, X2 6⊥ R. We thus conclude that both
X1 and X2 are potential but not necessarily genuine causes of
R (cf. section III-C).
If we learn a decoding model, on the other hand, we find
that only X1 ∈ XdecR , as X2 does not help for decoding if
X1 is already known due to X2 ⊥ R|X1. By only looking at
the decoding model, we would only identify X1 as a potential
cause of R.
Taken together, however, the only causal structures that can
give rise to these observations, again assuming faithfulness
and causal sufficiency, are X2 ← X1 → R or X2 → X1 → R
[7]. As in both structures X1 → R, we can conclude that
X1 is a direct cause of R. The role of X2, however, remains
ambiguous.
By learning both an encoding- and a decoding model on
the same data, and comparing relevant features, we have thus
again identified a causal relation between observed variables.
V. CONCLUSION
In the previous section, we have demonstrated on two
examples how the combination of encoding- and decoding
models can resolve ambiguities that can not be decided when
only looking at one type of model. This is due to the fact that
relevant features are determined by univariate independence
tests in encoding models and by multivariate conditional
independence tests in decoding models. Both types of tests
provide complementary information on the underlying causal
structure.
As we have shown in section IV-B, however, these tests do
not always uniquely determine the causal structure of a given
set of observed variables. In general, conditional independence
tests on all subsets of observed variables may provide further
information [7, 13]. An exhaustive description of the causal
inference rules based on conditional independence tests is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
We conclude by emphasizing that the causal structure, as
determined by a priori knowledge and/or causal inference
methods, has to be taken into account when interpreting
neuroimaging data.
REFERENCES
[1] T. Naselaris, K. N. Kay, S. Nishimoto, and J. L. Gallant,
“Encoding and decoding in fMRI,” NeuroImage, vol. 56,
no. 2, pp. 400–410, 2011.
[2] M. T. Todd, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen, “Confounds
in multivariate pattern analysis: Theory and rule repre-
sentation case study.” NeuroImage, vol. 77, pp. 157–165,
2013.
[3] S. Haufe, F. Meinecke, K. Görgen, S. Dähne, J.-D.
Haynes, B. Blankertz, and F. Bießmann, “On the interpre-
tation of weight vectors of linear models in multivariate
neuroimaging,” NeuroImage, vol. 87, pp. 96–110, 2014.
[4] F. Pereira, T. Mitchell, and M. Botvinick, “Machine
learning classifiers and fMRI: a tutorial overview,” Neu-
roImage, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. S199–S209, 2009.
[5] B. Schölkopf, D. Janzing, J. Peters, E. Sgouritsa,
K. Zhang, and J. Mooij, “On causal and anticausal
learning,” in 29th International Conference on Machine
Learning (ICML 2012), 2012, pp. 1255–1262.
[6] M. Gomez-Rodriguez, J. Peters, J. Hill, B. Schölkopf,
A. Gharabaghi, and M. Grosse-Wentrup, “Closing the
sensorimotor loop: haptic feedback facilitates decoding
of motor imagery,” Journal of Neural Engineering, vol. 8,
no. 3, p. 036005, 2011.
[7] J. Pearl, Causality: models, reasoning and inference.
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
[8] K. J. Friston, A. P. Holmes, K. J. Worsley, J.-P. Poline,
C. D. Frith, and R. S. Frackowiak, “Statistical parametric
maps in functional imaging: a general linear approach,”
Human Brain Mapping, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 189–210, 1994.
[9] T. M. Mitchell, R. Hutchinson, R. S. Niculescu,
F. Pereira, X. Wang, M. Just, and S. Newman, “Learning
to decode cognitive states from brain images,” Machine
Learning, vol. 57, no. 1-2, pp. 145–175, 2004.
[10] F. De Martino, G. Valente, N. Staeren, J. Ashburner,
R. Goebel, and E. Formisano, “Combining multivariate
voxel selection and support vector machines for mapping
and classification of fMRI spatial patterns,” NeuroImage,
vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 44–58, 2008.
[11] H. Reichenbach, The Direction of Time. University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1956.
[12] P. W. Holland, “Statistics and causal inference,” Journal
of the American Statistical Association, vol. 81, no. 396,
pp. 945–960, 1986.
[13] P. Spirtes, C. N. Glymour, and R. Scheines, Causation,
prediction, and search. MIT press, 2000.
[14] M. Grosse-Wentrup, B. Schölkopf, and J. Hill, “Causal
influence of gamma oscillations on the sensorimotor
rhythm,” NeuroImage, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 837–842, 2011.
